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Non-technical Summary 
Firm behavior is largely affected by the major institutions of an economy, like the legal 
system, civil liberties or political rights. If institutions are not well developed, ownership 
concentration as a feature of corporate governance may substitute for institutional shortfalls. 
Thus, especially in weak institutional environments ownership concentration may influence 
firm performance to an economically meaningful extent. 
The present paper tests this perception empirically by investigating the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm growth in 28 central and eastern European countries, 
where the state of institutional development varies considerably. The analysis is based on 
three waves of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the 
World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) from 2002 
to 2009.  
For those firms that operate in non-EU-member countries as well as those firms that are 
situated in less developed legal systems according to Freedom House ratings, regression 
results show an inverted u-shaped relation of ownership concentration and firm performance. 
We interpret these findings as evidence for a classic agency problem emanated from weaker 
monitoring by the shareholders if ownership concentration is low. With rising ownership 
concentration this effect is dominated by a ‘private benefits of control’ problem. Larger 
shareholders apparently let value enhancing growth opportunities forgo to avoid contests of 
control and save private benefits of being the sole controlling firm owner. An alternative 
explanation for this finding is that rising new equity for growth enhancing investments is 
especially challenging in less developed countries due to weak investor protection rights. But 
whoever is actually afraid of investing, the incumbent firm owner or potential new investors, 
staying with either highly or lowly concentrated ownership seems not to be growth 
maximizing for firms in institutionally less developed economies. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
Unternehmerisches Verhalten wird maßgeblich von wichtigen institutionellen 
Rahmenbedingungen wie dem Rechtssystem oder der Intensität staatlicher Eingriffe in zivile 
Belange beeinflusst. Sind die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen weniger weit entwickelt, 
kann die Eigentümerstruktur eines Unternehmens als Substitut für institutionelle Schwächen 
dienen. Besonders in schwächer ausgeprägten institutionellen Umgebungen könnte die 
Eigentümerstruktur daher einen wichtigen Einfluss auf das Unternehmenswachstum haben. 
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht diese Vermutung empirisch. Die Datenbasis bilden 
drei Wellen der „Business Environment and Enterprise Performance“ Umfrage (BEEPS), 
welche von der Europäischen Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung sowie der Weltbank 
im Zeitraum zwischen 2002 und 2009 erhoben wurden und Unternehmensdaten aus 28 
zentral- und osteuropäischen Staaten enthalten. 
Für Unternehmen, die ihren Firmensitz nicht in der EU oder institutionell weniger 
entwickelten Ländern haben, weisen Regressionsanalysen einen umgekehrt u-förmigen 
Zusammenhang zwischen der Eigentümerkonzentration und Unternehmenswachstum aus. 
Dieses Ergebnis kann als Hinweis auf ein klassisches Prinzipal-Agenten-Problem aufgrund 
schwächerer Unternehmenskontrolle interpretiert werden, wenn die Eigentümerkonzentration 
gering ist. Mit steigender Unternehmenskonzentration wird dieses Phänomen durch negative 
Auswirkungen allein kontrollierender Eigentümer abgelöst. Großeigentümer scheinen 
Wachstumsmöglichkeiten auszulassen, um private Vorteile der Eigentümerschaft zu 
bewahren. Alternativ könnten gerade in weniger entwickelten Staaten auch Schwierigkeiten 
bestehen, externe Investoren für Wachstum fördernde Investitionen zu gewinnen. Unabhängig 
davon, ob der bestehende Eigentümer oder neue externe Investoren Wachstum fördernde 
Investitionen verhindern, scheint jedenfalls weder eine sehr hohe noch sehr geringe 
Eigentümerkonzentration das Unternehmenswachstum in institutionell schwächer 
entwickelten Staaten zu maximieren. 
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship of ownership concentration and firm performance 
in the context of different institutional environments in 28 Central and Eastern European 
transition economies. Using the BEEPS data for the period from 2002 to 2009 we find 
an inverted u-shaped relation of ownership concentration and firm performance for 
those firms that operate in non-EU-member countries as well as those firms that are 
situated in less developed legal systems according to Freedom House ratings. We 
interpret these findings as evidence for a classic agency problem in the lower part of the 
ownership concentration distribution that is dominated by a ‘private benefits of control’ 
problem with rising ownership concentration. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding how the major institutions of an economy, like the legal system, civil liberties 
or political rights affect firm behavior and therefore economic development is crucial for 
policy makers as well as business professionals. Nowadays it is widely believed that the 
private sector is the main engine for economic growth. Therefore, one of the major tasks of 
governments is forming an institutional environment that helps firms exploiting their growth 
potentials. Two key factors of firm growth are access to a functioning capital market and a 
well developed and stable system of civil and political rights (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997, 1999, 
Papaioannou 2009). If these institutions are not that well developed, ownership concentration 
as a feature of corporate governance may substitute for institutional shortfalls (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Thus, especially in weak institutional environments ownership concentration 
could influence firm growth to an economically meaningful extent (Boubakri et al., 2005). 
We take this perception as motivation to investigate the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance in the context of different institutional environments in 
transition economies. Using three waves of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) from 2002 to 2009, we take advantage of the fact that some 
former transition economies have entered the European Union in the last decade. The BEEPS 
covers 28 transition economies in central and eastern Europe with nine of them being 
members of the European Union (EU) since 2004 or 2007, respectively. EU accession was 
accompanied with considerable institutional improvements for the affected countries. Hence, 
we observe markedly different levels of institutional development within the covered world 
region. This allows comparing the effect of ownership structure as a corporate governance 
mechanism within different institutional environments and legal systems. One of the basic 
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questions, we investigate is whether ownership as an internal corporate governance 
mechanism plays an important role in transition economies and whether ownership may serve 
as a substitute for weak legal environments. Gaining deeper knowledge of the interaction 
between corporate governance mechanisms and institutional surroundings is especially 
important for transition economies, because the legislation is typically used as one of the 
main and most powerful tools in shaping institutions for economic growth.  
Former studies beginning with La Porta et al. (1997) and a growing literature 
afterwards (see La Porta et al., 2008, for an overview) have already shown that law matters 
for corporate governance effectiveness and economic development (Chinn and Ito 2006). 
Closely related to our study, Boubakri et al. (2005) provide evidence that the role of 
ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism varies with different levels of 
institutional development in emerging market economies. By using a large sample of cross-
country firm-level data of almost all transition economies, we expand the understanding of 
corporate governance mechanisms within different institutional environments as well as our 
knowledge of the relationship between legal institutions and economic development.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that ownership concentration can serve as a substitute 
for weak investor protection rights. Therefore ownership concentration should be positively 
related to corporate performance especially in environments of weak legal systems. We 
examine this relationship empirically. While we find no significant linear relation between 
ownership concentration and firm performance, we find however an inverted u-shaped 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance for non-EU-member 
states - with a peak slightly above 50 % of the firm owned by the largest owner. This result 
also appears when we use an indicator for weak legal systems based on ‘Freedom House’ 
surveys instead of an EU-membership indicator. The results therefore suggest that the legal 
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environment matters for the effectiveness of ownership concentration as an internal corporate 
governance mechanism in transition economies. 
The inverted u-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance points to two main institutional deficiencies of the less developed transition 
economies. First, in case of a lack of a large controlling shareholder, companies in less 
developed legal systems seem to face the classical agency problem described first by Berle 
and Means (1932), whereby the managers of a firm realize private benefits on expense of the 
shareholders. Second, since firms having a highly concentrated ownership also perform 
below average, it seems that companies cannot exploit their whole growth potential due to 
scarce outside investors and/or high private benefits of control in weak institutional 
surroundings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ownership 
performance relationship in the context of weak institutional environments. Section 3 
describes the data, provides summary statistics and outlines methodical issues. In section 4 
we present and discuss our empirical findings and section 5 concludes.  
2. Ownership concentration, firm performance and institutional 
environment 
Low ownership concentration is classically associated with a principal-agent problem 
described by Berle and Means (1932), Baumol (1962), Marris (1963, 1964), and Williamson 
(1964). As managers do not bear the full costs of their decisions, it is assumed that managers 
try to carry out projects that maximize their private benefits which are not necessarily in the 
interest of the shareholders, i.e. profit-maximization. The managers are able to behave in this 
way because the principal(s) usually have only limited information on the manager’s effort 
and strategic decisions which makes monitoring difficult. Managers can use these 
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information asymmetries to deviate from the profit maximizing strategy that an owner-led 
firm would pursue. The shareholders try to minimize the resulting so called agency-costs by 
involving sophisticated contractual incentive mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) point out that managers frequently have power to 
influence the conditions of their contracts in their own interests which further increases the 
misalignment of manager and owner objectives and limits the usability of contracts to solve 
the agency problem. This practice gets even worse with falling ownership concentration due 
to the well-known free rider problem. The smaller the largest shareholder the lower are the 
incentives to invest into controlling the management because profits from improved 
monitoring go to all shareholders while the monitoring costs cannot be allocated among the 
other shareholders. Moreover, small shareholders often lack the necessary knowledge and 
industrial expertise to control the management effectively. In the end managers usually have 
a large area of discretion if the ownership structure is dispersed (Hart 2001).  
This is one main reason why the optimal ownership structure of a firm is maybe not the 
one without an actively controlling shareholder, especially in regions of weak legal systems 
where contract enforcement is limited. To have at least one shareholder with a sufficient high 
capital stake that makes active management supervision attractive may pay off for all owners 
therefore.  
Obviously, the principal-agent problem disappears if we consider a firm with 100% of 
equity in one hand. Nevertheless, it is not clear from a theoretical perspective where the 
optimal ownership concentration is located. Following the argumentation that higher capital 
stakes lead to improved monitoring and less agency-costs one could expect to find a positive 
linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. However, a 
highly concentrated ownership structure might be also suboptimal if thereby potential 
investment opportunities are lost. 
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The question which ownership structure, specifically which allocation of voting and 
cash flow rights is optimal for a firm was already addressed by Grossman and Hart (1988) 
and Harris and Raviv (1988). Until now that question is still open. From the existing 
literature, e.g. La Porta et. al. (2000), we know at least that the equilibrium ownership 
structure of a firm depends on the legal environment. Especially in weak legal environments 
it might be hard to find outside investors because expropriation risks for minority 
stakeholders are severe and private benefits of control are high (see Zingales, 1995, La Porta 
et al. 1999, and Bebchuk, 1999). If private benefits of control are high and investor protection 
is weak, Bebchuk’s (1999) model implies that private firm owners prefer to have high shares 
to limit the incentives of rivals to contest control. Insiders can get easier entrenched with 
raising stakes in their firm (see Morck et al., 1988). This entrenchment effect should also be 
more pronounced in weaker legal systems because contests for leadership through takeovers 
or proxy votes are harder to carry out. Furthermore, in weak legal systems the owner’s 
reputation might be needed to raise external funds without giving up control rights (La Porta 
et al. 2000). In small countries with highly concentrated firm ownership among a few 
families or individuals finally, owners can receive substantial political power within their 
countries or provinces their firms are located (La Porta et al., 1999). From an owner’s 
perspective not selling capital stakes or raising new equity can then be optimal, even if firm 
value enhancing investment opportunities forego thereby. Given these arguments, we would 
expect to find a negative correlation between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
Hence we are left with two opposing theories. On the one hand, we could argue for a 
positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance due to minimized agency 
costs. On the other hand, especially at the right tail of the ownership concentration 
distribution, missed investment opportunities and high private benefits of control might lead 
to a negative relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance.  
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The existing empirical literature on the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance has frequently found non-linear relationships. Starting with Morck et al. 
(1988) some papers found an ‘up/down/up’ relationship (see Cho, 1998, Short et al., 1999, 
Cosh et al., 2001, Gugler et al., 2004). According to these papers raising ownership 
concentration lowers agency costs when ownership concentration is very low, but at a certain 
point the positive effect of lower agency costs is dominated by negative effects due to rent 
seeking of large investors at the expense of small ones. If ownership concentration is very 
high however, exploiting small investors becomes less severe and shareholder and manager 
interests become more aligned which results in a small upward slope of the ownership 
concentration performance relation at the right tail of the ownership concentration 
distribution. However, other studies found an inverted u-shaped relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance (see, for the US, McConnell and Servaes, 
1990, Han and Suk, 1998, and, for Europe, Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) which suggests that 
the positive effect of a better alignment of shareholder and manager interests in the case of 
very high ownership concentration might be small compared to potential negative effects due 
to private benefits of controlling shareholders. Gugler et al. (2008) estimated the agency costs 
and private benefits effects separately with detailed firm level data for different developed 
countries around the world. Contingent on the legal systems they found differently 
pronounced inverted u-shaped relationships in Anglo-Saxon countries, English-origin and 
civil law countries. 
A limitation of the existing literature is that it often relies on data from highly 
developed economies with strong emphasis on an US or Anglo-Saxon institutional 
environment. Studies utilizing data from emerging markets or transition economies are much 
more scarce and typically focus on one or a few similar countries (see e.g. Bhaumik and 
Estrin, 2007, for China and Russia, Driffield et al., 2007, for East Asian countries, 
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Filatotchev et al., 2007, for evidence on Hungarian and Polish firms, or Gregoric and Vespro, 
2009, for Slovenia). Moreover the data used in other studies are often not a randomly drawn, 
and thus representative, sample which makes inference for the whole economy difficult. By 
using randomly drawn cross-country data at the firm level for 28 different transition 
economies, we make two important contributions to the literature. First, we provide evidence 
on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance for a large, fast 
growing region of the world where empirical cross-country studies are notoriously scant. 
Second, we enhance our knowledge of the importance of differences in institutional 
environments for effective corporate governance mechanisms and economic development 
within the group of almost all transition economies.  
3. Data, descriptive statistics and methodological remarks 
For our empirical investigation we use three waves of the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) covering the period from 2002 to 2009. The first 
wave in the year 2002 covered approximately 6,500 firms, while the second round includes 
9,500 companies in the year 2005. The latest wave was conducted in 2008-2009 and covered 
11,800 companies. Table 1 shows all covered countries, the number of companies per country 
used in this study and the information if the respective country entered the EU in 2004 or 
2007, respectively.1 After removing observations with inconsistent answers in the 
questionnaire or missing values in the variables of interest, the final sample includes 20,638 
observations in total. 
                                                 
1 Further detailed information on the construction of the survey can be found on the homepage of the 
EBRD under “www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml”. Fries et al. (2003) checked the 
2002 wave for an individual perception bias in the BEEPS data but found none. 
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Table 1: Sample overview 
Country Firms 
EU-
accession Weak law Country Firms 
EU-
accession 
Weak 
law 
Albania 379   Latvia 
515 2004  
Armenia 752   Lithuania 
576 2004  
Azerbaijan 733  
2002-2009 Moldova 754  2009 
Belarus 697  
2002-2008 Montenegro 119  2002 
Bosnia 556   Poland 
1549 2004  
Bulgaria 707 2007  Romania 
1151 2007  
Croatia 405   Russia 
1846  2002-2009 
Czech 
Republic 612 2004  Serbia 739  2002 
Estonia 566 2004  Slovakia 483 2004  
FYROM 550   Slovenia 583 2004  
Georgia 588   Tajikistan 
571  2002-2008 
Hungary 1021 2004  Turkey 
747   
Kazakhstan 1141  
2002-2009 Ukraine 998   
Kyrgyz 550  
2002-2005 Uzbekistan 750   
2002-
2008 
Total number of observations: 20638 
Note: The third wave of the BEEPS was conducted between 2008 and 2009. All countries covered in 
2008 are not covered in 2009, et vice versa. 
 
An important feature of the BEEPS data for our study is the fact that it provides 
comparable firm-level information on a large set of firms in almost all transition economies 
with different levels of institutional development. Despite the long time span covered an 
appropriate firm-level panel is however not available. Out of 16,166 different firms in the 
total sample, only 1,928 firms can be observed in two waves and only 205 firms are observed 
over the full covered period, i.e. the three waves of the survey. Thus, we use pooled cross-
sectional data in our econometric specifications to avoid a further loss of numerous 
observations and to enable an analysis of country differences in institutional environments at 
the firm level. 
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Variables 
As dependent variable, we use employment growth over the last three years as a proxy for 
firm performance [(employmentit – employmenti,t-3) / employmenti,t-3 × 100], as this is the only 
performance variable that can be obtained from the BEEPS for a large sample of firms. More 
direct measures of firm performance like profits or market value of the company were not 
requested in the survey. 
Our main explanatory variable ‘blockholder’ is the percentage of a company’s shares 
that is owned by the largest owner. We also use the square of this variable in order to allow 
for a non-linear relationship as discussed above. In the regression analysis, we will estimate 
the effect of blockholder on growth for (i) the full sample, (ii) the samples of EU member 
states and non-member states (see sample definition in Table 1), and, as an alternative 
specification, (iii) for samples that are split by an indicator on the development of the 
countries’ legal systems. 
Legal system development is measured by a dichotomous variable indicating whether a 
country reaches more than 4 points on the Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil 
liberty. Freedom House assigns numerical ratings of political rights and civil liberty for 193 
countries around the world on a scale of 1 to 7 since 1972. A rating of 1 represents the 
highest degree and 7 the lowest. The political rights score measures the degree to which 
people are able to participate freely in the political process while the civil liberty rating 
measures personal autonomy from interference from the state. The underlying research and 
rating process is based on a sophisticated standardized system that involves a crew of analysts 
and senior-level academic advisers.2 We use the Freedom House ratings to gain an alternative 
measure of institutional development that is directly related to the legal system in each 
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of the underlying methodology of the Freedom House rating, see 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=354&year=2009.  
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country. A country is assessed as institutionally ‘weak’ if the political rights score as well as 
the civil liberty rating reach 5 points or more each. 
In addition, we add several control variables that may affect growth and could thus 
possibly confound the estimated relationship between growth and blockholder if the controls 
were not included in the regression.  
As we use growth measured in percent, it is essential to control for initial size in period 
t-3, as small firms will naturally grow relatively more than larger firms if the absolute growth 
in employees is equivalent. Therefore, ln(employmenti,t-3) enters the regression as right-hand 
side variable. Similarly one can argue that older firms often have lower growth potentials 
than younger firms due to a higher fraction of already identified and realized growth 
opportunities. Thus, the logarithm of a firm’s age is included as a further explanatory variable 
in the regression framework as well. 
Furthermore, we control for possible differences in average growth of state-owned and 
foreign-owned firms when compared to privately owned, domestic companies. Two dummy 
variables indicating firms that are state-owned or foreign-owned account for these specific 
kinds of ownership. We also include a binary variable indicating whether a firm is publicly 
quoted to control for differences through a superior access to the capital market. 
Additionally, we control for human capital intensity by the fraction of employees with a 
university degree, as a highly skilled workforce could accelerate firm growth through a 
higher likelihood for, and faster, implementations of process and product innovations. Access 
to foreign markets is usually a crucial factor for firm growth, too. Hence, the percentage of 
sales to foreign customers is taken as another right-hand side variable. 
As the BEEPS survey is focused on transition economies, it features a special variable 
concerning black market competition, as especially in less developed economies official 
registration of firms is not always enforced. Competition from informal or unregistered firms 
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(and thus not included in the survey) can reduce growth. The survey participants were asked 
to indicate whether they face such non-official competition, and this enters the regression as 
dummy variable ‘competition’. 
Finally, we use full sets of three year, 26 industry, and 27 country dummies to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity over time, and across different industries and countries. Table 2 
summarizes all variables used.  
Table 2: Summary of variables 
Variable Description Source 
Employment growth (Employmentit – Employmenti,t-3) /  Employmenti,t-3 × 100 
BEEPS 
Blockholder Percentage of ownership held by shareholder BEEPS 
Employmenti,t-3 Employment in physical units in t-3 BEEPS 
Age Years since the company was founded BEEPS 
Human capital Percentage of employees with a university degree BEEPS 
Export Percentage of international sales BEEPS 
State-owned Dummy indicating whether the firm is wholly owned 
by the government  BEEPS 
Foreign-owned Dummy indicating whether the firm is wholly owned 
by a foreigner or foreign firm BEEPS 
Publicly quoted Dummy indicating whether the firm is publicly quoted BEEPS 
Competition Dummy indicating whether the firm faces competition from informal/unregistered firms BEEPS 
Weak legal system 
Dummy indicating if the company operates in a 
country that reaches at least 5 points on the Freedom 
House ratings of  political rights and civil liberty 
Freedom House 
Political rights Political freedom rating (1-7) according to Freedom House Freedom House 
Civil liberty Civil liberty rating (1-7) according to Freedom House Freedom House 
Note: Three time dummies, 26 industry dummies and 27 country dummies not presented. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of all variables separated by EU membership 
status. The average 3-year growth rate is about 26 % for firms in non-EU-member states and 
19 % for firms operating within EU-member states. Note, however, that the median growth 
rate is zero for both groups. Thus, there is quite some turbulence in the sample countries. 
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From the descriptive statistics we do not observe marked differences in our ownership 
variable blockholder between EU (78%) and non-EU-member states (76%). This is also the 
case for the separation by legal system development, where the averages amount to 76% for 
the observations within weak legal systems and 77% for the others (not shown in Table 3). 
Note that the sample separation by EU-membership versus weak legal systems is not trivial. 
As Table 3 shows, all EU-member countries have quite well developed legal systems 
according to Freedom House ratings but not all non-EU-member states perform badly in this 
sense. Nine of 28 covered countries had a less developed legal system in 2002 which changed 
to seven less developed countries afterwards (see Table 1). 
As we do not observe an average difference in the variable blockholder in the split 
samples, we additionally show histograms to have a closer look at the whole distribution of 
the variable.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of ownership concentration 
 
As could be expected, the majority of firms is wholly owned by a single shareholder. 
This is not surprising, as we consider a representative sample of the economies and not only 
large, publicly traded companies as it is often the case in studies using US or Anglo-Saxon 
data. In addition, a high concentration of ownership can be expected as we deal with 
transition economies where capital markets are typically less developed than in fully 
industrialized countries such as the US, Japan, or countries located in Western Europe. 
However, we also see that there is a fair amount of data over the whole distribution of the 
ownership variable. Thus, we have sufficient support for fitting a possible non-linear 
relationship between growth and ownership over the whole distribution of our main 
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explanatory variable of interest. We also see that the distributions are similar across the 
sample split. Note that this does not conform to the hypotheses of Zingales (1995), La Porta 
et al. (1999), and Bebchuk (1999) who believe that ownership concentration should be higher 
in environments with weak legal systems. As we outline below, however, we also find some 
structural differences between the split samples with respect to other covariates. Therefore, 
our univariate analysis cannot be seen as a ceteris paribus comparison. Therefore, we follow 
up on this issue in the following section where we conduct multivariate, econometric 
analyses. 
As Table 3 indicates there are some structural differences between EU and non-EU 
countries. Most striking is the share of high skilled labor. It amounts to 32% in non-EU 
countries, whereas firms in EU countries employ only about 19% of high skilled personnel in 
the total labor force. Interestingly, non-EU firms are also larger, on average (115 versus 94 
employees), and are more likely to be publicly traded (8% versus 4%). In terms of exports, 
EU firms achieve a slightly higher share of foreign sales (13% versus 10%) and are less likely 
to be state-owned (4% versus 6%). EU firms also report less informal competition (14% 
versus 16%). The two samples are similar in terms of age of the companies and the share of 
foreign ownership. See Table 6 in the appendix for results of t-tests on mean differences of 
variables across the split samples. It turns out that almost all variables differ significantly 
between both EU and non-EU members as well as countries with weak and non-weak legal 
systems. Note that the distribution across industries also differs significantly among the 
samples.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics separated by EU membership status 
non-EU-member 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Employment growth 14588 25.71 68.77 -86.00 466.67 
Blockholder 14588 75.82 28.67 1 100 
Employmenti,t-3 14588 115.10 390.08 1 15000 
Age 14588 16.03 17.83 1 202 
Human capital 14588 32.35 29.19 0 100 
Export 14588 10.11 24.22 0 100 
State-owned 14588 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Foreign-owned 14588 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Publicly quoted 14588 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Competition 14588 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Weak legal system 14588 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Political rights 14132 4.35 1.86 1 7 
Civil liberty 14132 3.94 1.37 2 7 
EU-member 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Employment growth 6050 18.58 58.50 -86.08 466.67 
Blockholder 6050 77.74 27.77 1 100 
Employmenti,t-3 6050 93.73 395.35 1 15000 
Age 6050 16.27 15.80 1 184 
Human capital 6050 19.17 24.87 0 100 
Export 6050 13.15 27.46 0 100 
State-owned 6050 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Foreign-owned 6050 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Publicly quoted 6050 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Competition 6050 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Weak legal system 6050 0 0 0 0 
Political rights 6050 1.35 0.64 1 3 
Civil liberty 6050 1.30 0.46 1 2 
Note: Three time dummies, 26 industry dummies and 27 country dummies not presented. 
4. Econometric results 
Before we analyze the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance, our main 
research question, we first investigate the hypothesis whether weaker institutional 
frameworks lead to higher ownership concentration as coined by Zingales (1995), La Porta et 
al. (1997), and Bebchuk (1999). Therefore, we regress ownership concentration on all 
covariates mentioned in the previous section except growth and countries dummies. The 
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latter cannot be included as both our indicators on institutional circumstances only vary 
across countries but not within a country. We also exclude the variables wholly state-owned 
and wholly foreign-owned as their definition emerges from the variable blockholder that is 
used as dependent variable here. 
Table 4: OLS regressions for ownership concentration 
Dependent variable: blockholder 
Variables Model A Model B 
non-EU-member dummy 1.139** 
(2.38) 
weak legal system dummy 1.527*** 
(3.48) 
log(Employmenti,t-3) -2.093*** -2.143*** 
(-14.68) (-14.92) 
log(Age) -1.824*** -1.718*** 
(-5.88) (-5.49) 
Human capital -0.025*** -0.026*** 
(-3.31) (-3.45) 
Export -0.022*** -0.019** 
(-2.56) (-2.17) 
Publicly-quoted -8.706*** -8.734*** 
(-10.30) (-10.36) 
Competition -0.882 -0.707 
  (-1.46) (-1.17) 
F-test on joint significance of time dummies  104.11*** 102.21*** 
F-test on joint significance of industry dummies  5.36*** 5.44*** 
R2 0.058 0.058 
Number of observations 20638 20638 
Notes: All regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. t-values are given in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
As one can see in Table 4, we find evidence that ownership concentration is higher 
when the institutional environment in an economy is weak, all else constant. In non-EU 
member countries the largest owner holds about 1.2% more than in EU countries. In countries 
that we classified as having a weak legal system according to the Freedom House ratings, this 
effect amount to about 1.5%. Thus, we conclude that our data is consistent with the 
theoretical predictions as discussed above. Although, this effect is statistically significant, it 
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is somewhat small in terms of economic magnitude. It could be argued that an average 
difference of 1.5% of ownership concentration between weak and strong legal systems, may 
not alter the governance structure in an economically significant manner. 
Also note that the control variables all show the expected sign. In larger and older 
firms, ownership is more dispersed. Similarly, this holds for firms employing a higher share 
of skilled labor. As surely expected, publicly quoted firms also show lower ownership 
concentration. Finally, the more internationalized a firm, as approximated by the export ratio, 
the higher is the ownership dispersion. 
Now, we turn to our main research question, and investigate the effect of blockholder 
on firm performance, where we allow for a non-linear relationship that was also found in 
similar studies for other countries.3 
Table 5 provides first estimation results for the full sample. To investigate differences 
in the effect of ownership concentration within different institutional environments, Table 5 
also contains separate estimations for those companies that operate in EU and non-EU-
member countries4 as well as separate estimations for those companies that operate in more 
and less developed countries in terms of their legal systems as measured by Freedom House 
ratings. 
                                                 
3 We also tested for an up/down/up slope but did not find significant results. 
4 Alternative models were estimated with countries always handled as EU-member countries even if EU-
accession took place later. The results stayed qualitatively the same.  
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Table 5: OLS regressions for employment growth 
Dependent variable: employment growth 
  full sample 
non-EU-
member 
EU-
member 
weak  
legal system 
strong  
legal system 
Blockholder 0.148* 0.204* 0.001 0.326** 0.089 
(1.75) (1.94) (0.01) (2.01) (0.89) 
Blockholder2 -0.002** -0.002** 0.0001 -0.003** -0.001 
(-2.38) (-2.42) (-0.42) (-2.33) (-1.44) 
State-owned 0.288 -1.380 6.011* 2.210 -1.082 
(0.16) (-0.65) (1.94) (0.75) (-0.48) 
Foreign-owned 11.849*** 10.807*** 11.705*** 7.870 12.650*** 
(5.27) (3.7) (3.38) (1.56) (5.03) 
log(Employeesit-3) -8.390*** -9.577*** -6.136*** -10.639*** -7.515*** 
(-23.15) (-20.72) (-10.70) (-14.59) (-18.14) 
log(Age) 11.481*** -10.459*** -14.101*** -8.298*** -12.893*** 
(-16.82) (-12.81) (-11.29) (-6.52) (-15.94) 
Human capital -0.02 -0.014 -0.039 0.000 -0.033 
(-1.04) (-0.62) (-1.12) (-0.01) (-1.33) 
Export 0.130*** 0.142*** 0.104*** 0.183*** 0.119*** 
(6.31) (5.3) (3.27) (3.41) (5.27) 
Publicly quoted -2.827* -4.155** 2.962 0.813 -3.486* 
(-1.68) (-2.16) (0.80) (0.28) (-1.67) 
Competition 0.428 0.528 0.008 -0.574 0.798 
  (0.3) (0.3) (0.00) (-0.22) (0.46) 
F-test time dummies 13.04*** 6.69*** 16.82*** 3.12** 13.17*** 
F-test country dummies  12.74*** 6.96*** 8.41*** 9.61*** 11.15*** 
F-test industry dummies 6.6*** 5.34*** 2.87*** 2.95*** 5.26*** 
R2 0.094 0.099 0.087 0.092 0.101 
Number of obs. 20638 14588 6050 6547 14091 
Notes: All regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. t-values are given in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
For the full sample we find an inverted u-shaped relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance with a turning point at about 48 % ownership 
concentration on the largest owner. The relationship is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Effect of Blockholder on employment growth (full sample) 
 
We interpret this result as evidence for a classic agency conflict between shareholders 
and manager(s) of a firm, when a controlling shareholder is absent. That those firms with 
especially high ownership concentration also perform poorly points to high private benefits of 
control and underdeveloped investor protection rights. It seems that large owners either want 
to protect their private benefits of control because they are afraid of exploitation of their own 
investment in the case that another sufficient powerful investor joins the company, or investor 
protection is so poor that external investors for new projects are discouraged already in the 
first place. Both arguments lead to an interpretation of forgone investment opportunities that 
explain the result of weaker employment growth of firms with one large owner who holds 
more than 48 % of ownership of the company. 5 
                                                 
5 We also conducted a robustness test where we do not specify a squared relationship between growth 
and blockholder, but use a series of dummy variables. We used a separate dummy for full ownership of 100% 
and computed ten dummies for the remaining observations according to the deciles of the blockholder 
distribution. This specification confirms an inverted u-relationship, but between the 7th decile and the last decile 
of the distribution (excluding 100% ownership) the shape of the curve is a somewhat more fuzzy than the 
squared specification suggests. 
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As the institutional environment and the legal system are supposed to play a crucial role 
for investor protection and the effectiveness of ownership concentration as a corporate 
governance device, the sample is split into EU and non-EU countries, as well as weak and 
strong legal systems. As a main result we see that the inverted u-shaped relationship we 
found in the full sample is actually driven by those countries that are not in the EU or have a 
weak legal system, respectively. The starting values of the negative effect of ownership 
concentration are, with 52 % for non-EU-member countries and 56 % for countries with a 
less developed legal system, slightly higher than estimated in the full sample, which suggests 
that a monitoring shareholder lowers agency costs.  
Figure 3: Effect of Blockholder on employment growth (subsamples) 
 
Having a blockholder owning an absolute majority of stakes is usually sufficient to 
control the management effectively, which might explain the decreasing effectiveness of 
growing ownership concentration. Consequently the positive monitoring effect is dominated 
by the difficulty of external investor’s enticement if ownership concentration rises above 
52 % or 56 %, respectively. These effects are statistically as well as economically more 
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pronounced in transition economies with weak legal systems compared to non-EU-member 
countries as Table 5 and Figure 3 show. Furthermore, the estimated slopes suggest that the 
positive monitoring effect is nearly offset in the non-EU-member countries with rising 
ownership concentration while for firms in weak legal environments high ownership 
concentration seems to be preferable compared to a highly dispersed ownership structure.  
According to the models for the subsamples of EU countries or countries with strong 
legal systems, respectively, ownership concentration has no significant influence on firm 
performance. Similar to other world regions institutional environments appear to matter for 
the effectiveness of ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism. An 
interpretation of the evidence could be that firms in well developed transition economies do 
not need large blockholders for management monitoring and private benefits of control are 
not as common as in weaker institutional environments.   
For government-owned firms we find only one significant positive effect in EU-
member countries at the 10 % level, which could be interpreted as weak evidence for an 
effective employment policy in the EU. In line with other studies on corporate ownership and 
firm performance in transition economies, we find strong evidence that foreign-owned firms 
perform better than domestic companies. Interestingly this finding does not hold for transition 
economies with a weak legal system. This result might be explainable by the fact that either 
well prepared foreign investors tend not to launch firms within weak legal environments or 
those firms who are already there are hindered by institutional obstacles to use their possibly 
superior techniques, knowledge and management that makes them more successful in other 
transition economies. 
Referring to the remaining explanatory variables reveals mostly the expected signs and 
magnitudes. More employees in t-3 and higher firm ages are significantly negative correlated 
with employment growth in all models which reflects usual firm growth paths. A higher 
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fraction of employees with a university degree has no influence on firm performance. Maybe 
firms with higher human capital intensity work more efficient and can grow therefore without 
relying on workforce enhancement. Exporting is positively associated with firm performance 
in all models at high significance levels which supports the perception that access to foreign 
markets is important for firm growth. Finally we find weak evidence for less pronounced firm 
growth of firms that are publicly-quoted compared to non-listed firms. This finding could be 
explained by the already mentioned initial size dependents of firm growth because listed 
firms are regularly at an upper part of their growth path and have already a quite high 
workforce compared to the average non-listed firm. Fast growing small firms are usually not 
publicly-quoted. Somehow surprising, informal competition has no significant influence on 
firm growth which points to the fact that this problem is maybe overestimated from a 
theoretical perspective. 
5. Conclusions 
The present paper provides evidence of an inverted u-shaped relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance in transition economies with weak 
institutional environments. For less developed transition economies that are not member of 
the EU and those with inferior legal systems ownership concentrations seems to play an 
important role in management monitoring. Up to slightly above 50 % ownership 
concentration, firm performance increases in terms of employment growth. It declines 
however after passing a certain peak value around 55 %, on average. Hence, the positive 
monitoring effect of a controlling large shareholder is dominated by a stronger negative effect 
from these turning points onwards. We interpret this finding, on the one hand, as evidence for 
high private benefits of control with the implication that fewer large owners want to share 
these benefits with other investors even if lucrative investment opportunities forgo thereby. 
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On the other hand, these findings are consistent with the interpretation that investor 
protection rights are poor in weak institutional and legal environments which leads to an 
undersupply of capital and therefore lower growth of firms that are not able to attract outside 
investors. Regardless which explanation actually holds it seems evident that firms in 
transition economies with weak institutional environments do not exploit their growth 
opportunities. This interpretation is also supported by the finding that only in transition 
economies with weak legal systems foreign owners are not associated with higher firm 
growth than domestic ones.  
Finally, it should be noted that our study is not without limitations. First, it would be 
desirable to have panel data for the analysis. This would allow controlling for growth 
differences because of unobserved heterogeneity, for instance management quality. However, 
we believe that unobserved heterogeneity should not cause major differences in the findings 
if long time-series would available. As our dependent variable is measured as percentage 
changes in terms of growth, it would be unlikely that factors unobserved to the researcher that 
are time constant would drive the results substantially. It would require that a firm basically 
growths exponentially over time due to time-constant factors.  
Second, it would however be highly desirable to have panel data in order to control for 
the potential endogeneity of our covariates. Our current specification may suffer from 
feedback effects from growth to blockholder and also to some other covariates. Panel data 
would offer natural candidates for instrumental variables. In this study, we are unfortunately 
not able to instrument our covariates due to the cross-sectional structure of the data. Neither 
does the survey offer other compelling variables that could serve as instrumental variables. 
Therefore, we cannot claim causality for our results found. One should rather see this as 
explorative study suggesting that corporate governance structures may be an important factor 
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driving long-run growth in transition economies. More research identifying causality in more 
detail should be conducted when richer data become available. 
Further research which disentangles the positive management monitoring effect and the 
negative effect of private benefits of control in transition economies would also be an 
interesting extension of our work. 
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Appendix 
Table 6: Results of t-tests on mean differences in variables between split samples 
Non-EU vs. EU Weak law vs. Strong law 
t-values  for H0: mean(non-
eu)-mean(eu)=0  
t-values  for H0: mean(weak 
law)-mean(strong law)=0  Variable 
Employee growth 7.57*** 0.27 
Blockholder -4.46*** 1.82* 
Employees, t-3 3.55*** 2.29** 
Age -0.95 -10.19*** 
Human capital 32.89*** 22.23*** 
Export -7.5*** -22.89*** 
State-owned 6.59*** 1.09 
Foreign-owned -4.7*** -6.45*** 
Publicly quoted 10.41*** 7.41*** 
Competition 4.71*** -6.4*** 
Weak legal system 108.98***  
Political rights 168.74*** 297.56*** 
Civil liberty 203.62*** 273.84*** 
 
 
